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Recent years have seen a growing interest among donors on taxation in developing countries. 
This reflects a concern for domestic revenue mobilization to finance public goods and 
services, as well as recognition of the centrality of taxation for growth and redistribution. The 
global financial crisis has also led many donor countries to pay more attention to the extent 
and effectiveness of the aid they provide, and to ensuring that they support rather than 
discourage the developing countries’ own revenue-raising efforts. This paper reviews the 
state of knowledge on aid and tax reform in developing countries, with a particular focus on 
sub-Saharan Africa. Four main issues are addressed: (1) impacts of donor assistance to … / 
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….. strengthen tax systems, including what has worked, or not, and why; (2) challenges in 
‘scaling up’ donor efforts; (3) how to best provide assistance to reform tax systems; and (4) 
knowledge gaps to be filled in order to design better donor interventions. The paper argues 
that donors should complement the traditional ‘technical’ approach to tax reform with 
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Recent years have seen a growing interest among donors on taxation in developing countries. 
The importance of strengthening domestic revenue mobilization was emphasized by the G20-
leaders at their summit in November 2010. The link between taxation and development is 
highlighted by the European Commission (EC 2010) and by the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (OECD 2011). The renewed interest in taxation reflects a concern for 
domestic revenue mobilization to finance public spending, as well as recognition of the 
centrality of taxation to growth and redistribution. An effective tax system is considered 
central for sustainable development because it can mobilize the domestic revenue base as a 
key mechanism for developing countries to escape from aid or single natural resource 
dependency. The global financial crisis has also led many donor countries to pay more 
attention to the extent and effectiveness of the aid they provide, and to ensure that they 
support rather than discourage the latter’s own revenue-raising efforts.  
 
At the same time, there is a growing recognition that taxation and state-building are linked 
(Braütigam et al. 2008).1 There is a strong argument in the literature that a substantial 
governance ‘dividend’ can be gained from mobilizing domestic financial resources through 
the tax system. The tax system may contribute to improved governance through three main 
channels (Moore 2008; Prichard 2010): 
 
(i) Common interest processes which ensure that governments have stronger incentives 
to promote economic growth since they are dependent on taxes and therefore on the 
prosperity of taxpayers. 
 
(ii) State capacity processes which require states to develop a bureaucratic apparatus for 
tax collection because of their dependence on taxes. This is also expected to lead to 
broader improvements in public administration. 
 
(iii) Fiscal bargaining by engaging citizens in the political process. Taxpayers have a 
legitimate right to expect something in return for taxes paid, and are more likely to 
hold their government to account if it underperforms. This idea of fiscal bargaining 
and negotiation over taxes is central to the concept of a social fiscal contract. 
 
Although these tax-governance linkages are complex and context-specific, and much of the 
evidence is anecdotal, it is clear that there are strong synergies between tax reforms and 
governance (OECD-DAC 2012). If tax reform is undertaken in a way that promotes greater 
responsiveness and accountability, alongside improvements in the state’s institutional 
capacity, then tax reform can become a catalyst for broader improvements in government 
performance. Seen in this light, taxation is not just an administrative task for governments 
and citizens. It is also about politics and power, and the way that authority is exercised in a 
country through its formal and informal institutions. 
 
How can donors assist in building effective tax systems in developing countries? This paper 
reviews the state of knowledge on aid and tax reform with particular attention to cases and 
                                                
1 State-building can be defined broadly as ‘increasing the capacity of governments to interact constructively 
with societal interests, to obtain support and resources from those interests, and to pursue consistent lines of 
action’ (Moore 2008). 
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experiences from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). While much has been written about overall 
reform trends and progress (Drummond et al. 2012; Keen 2012; Bird 2008; IMF 2011), less 
attention has been paid to questions about how donors could better support the strengthening 
of links between tax reform and broader governance and state-building goals (Prichard et al. 
2012a). This includes the development of the local government tax system which is likely to 
impact large segments of the population and thus the shaping of accountability relations 
between citizens and the state (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001; Fjeldstad 2001; Fjeldstad and 
Therkildsen 2008; Jibao and Prichard 2012). A key argument in this paper is that donors 
should complement the traditional ‘technical’ approach to tax reform with measures that 
encourage constructive engagement between governments and citizens over tax issues. 
 
Section 2 of the paper reviews experiences with donor assistance to strengthen tax systems in 
developing countries. It draws lessons for both tax policy and administration on what has 
worked—or not—and why. Section 3 assesses main challenges in ‘scaling up’ donor efforts, 
focusing on how donors best can provide assistance to reform tax systems. Knowledge gaps 
and issues for further research in order to design better donor interventions are discussed in 
section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes. The conclusion cautions against potential problems of 
donor duplication and fragmentation, which may undermine reform efforts by diverting local 
capacities, reducing local ownership and undermining the coherence of reform programmes. 
2 Donor assistance to taxation: what has worked, or not worked, and why 
Donor involvement with tax reform in developing countries is not new. The Shoup mission to 
Japan in 1949 is often referred to as the birth of foreign technical assistance on taxation to 
developing countries (Keen 2012: 9; Gillis 1990). Over the next three decades, Carl Shoup 
together with other leading fiscal economists advised tax reform packages in countries as 
diverse as Japan, Liberia, Venezuela, Korea, Taiwan, and Bolivia. Much of the early efforts 
focused on the development of income tax as the centrepiece of a ‘modern’ tax system.  
 
In the 1960s, a period when a number of African countries gained their independence from 
the colonial powers, leading economists argued that the new states should give the 
development of effective tax systems priority (Kaldor 1963). An economic survey mission 
organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the 
Governments of Tanganyika and the United Kingdom in 1959/60, provided detailed advice 
on tax reforms (IBRD 1961). The survey mission agreed that the Tanganyika authorities were 
justified in their preference for a relatively low company tax (IBRD 1961: 325), and 
concluded that greater tax revenues should be sought not through higher tax rates, but 
through expansion of taxable economic activity. The study also proposed the introduction of 
a low and uniform tax on exports, in line with many other developing countries at that time 
which relied rather heavily on export taxes as a source of revenue (IBRD 1961: 327-8). 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s the reform of trade taxes was a major component of donor funded 
structural adjustment reforms (Bird and Oldman 1990; Thirsk 1997). According to Gillis 
(1990: 77-8), the impetus for tax reform during this period did not come from those 
responsible for assessment and collection of tax, but rather from a donor government or from 
the ministry of finance in the specific country advised by the IMF and/or the World Bank. 
The general advice was to abolish export taxes and lower import duties. 
 
After a period of declining funding beginning in the latter part of the 1990s, funding for tax- 
related assistance appears to have increased recently, though it remains relatively modest as a 
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share of total donor programmes (ITC 2012).2 Whereas tax reform has traditionally been the 
preserve of the IMF and, although to a lesser extent, the World Bank, recent years have seen 
expanding interest in taxation amongst a wide range of bilateral donors, regional 
development banks, and other international agencies (Fjeldstad and Moore 2009; ITC 2012). 
At the same time, the content of the tax reform agenda has broadened. Where earlier reform 
efforts focused strongly on the reduction of trade taxes, their replacement with value added 
tax (VAT), and the lowering of direct tax rates, contemporary reform efforts focus 
increasingly on improving tax administration (Bird 2008; IMF 2011). There is also a growing 
interest in the links between taxation, accountability and broader state-building goals (Keen 
2012; Bird 2012; Prichard et al. 2012a).  
 
Against this backdrop, donor support to taxation can be grouped into three broad working 
areas:3 (1) improving tax policy and design; (2) creating more effective tax administrations; 
and (3) encouraging constructive state-society engagement around taxes. In the following 
paragraphs I discuss key features and outcomes of each of these broad donor supported 
reform areas.4 
2.1 Improving tax policy and design 
Technical assistance has included reforms of tax legislation, simplification of tax structures 
and abolishment of some taxes and introduction of new ones. The overarching objective has 
been to raise revenues. Until the mid-1980s income redistribution considerations also played 
a significant role in shaping many of the decisions on tax reform (Gillis 1990: 81). As noted 
above, much of the early efforts focused on the development of a progressive personal 
income tax system.  
 
Progressive income taxation has not become the major tax base as initially anticipated. 
Personal income tax accounts for less than 10 per cent of all tax revenue in most low-income 
countries, compared to an average of more than 25 per cent in OECD-countries (Keen 2012: 
10). It comes almost entirely from wage withholding (pay-as-you-earn) tax on public sector 
and large enterprises employees. Commonly, less than 5 per cent of the population pay 
personal income tax, compared to nearly 50 per cent in developed countries (IMF 2011: 31). 
Zolt and Bird characterize the current personal income tax regime as follows: ‘… in most 
developing countries, the global personal income tax long advocated by experts is in fact 
neither global or progressive, nor personal, not often even on income’. The reasons for the 
                                                
2 According to unpublished OECD data, less than 0.1 per cent of official development assistance was 
allocated to identifiable tax activities in 2009 (OECD-DAC 2012: 38). This figure is at odds with the current 
level of international interest in domestic revenue mobilization. 
3 International Tax Compact categorizes donor support to taxation and development into four broad working 
areas (ITC 2010: vii): (1) tax policy and reform (e.g. different types of taxes, tax systems reform, simplification 
of tax structures); (2) tax administration and organizational reform (e.g. integration and establishment of 
revenue authorities, institutional efficiency, large taxpayer units); (3) tax law (e.g. legislation, procedural law); 
and (4) tax procedure (e.g. auditing, enforcement, automation). In this paper, I have included tax legislation in 
the first working area on tax policy and design, while auditing and enforcement are part of the reform of tax 
administration. Encouraging constructive state-society relations around taxation is not explicitly addressed by 
ITC.  
4 There have been no systematic assessments of the success of this broad tax reform agenda. Barbone et al. 
(1999) reviewed tax related assistance by the World Bank. Such assistance was also covered by the 2008 
evaluation of the World Bank’s support to public sector reform (IEG 2008). These studies, however, focused on 
World Bank experiences. 
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failure of personal income taxation reflect both administrative and political weaknesses, 
including a very narrow set of taxpayers, poor capacity to expand the tax base to the self-
employed, and resistance from the elite and wealthy individuals with ample opportunities to 
conceal their income. 
 
By the 1980s, donor funded technical assistance had come to encompass a standard set of 
recommendations and priorities (Prichard et al. 2012a).5 The popularization of these ‘best 
practices’ has led Fjeldstad and Moore (2008) to refer to a ‘global tax reform agenda’. 
Governments in developing countries have been urged to desist from using taxation to try to 
mobilize savings or to transfer resources from agriculture to non-agriculture; to rely less on 
revenue from easily-taxable imports and exports; and to place less emphasis on using high 
marginal tax rates in the effort to reduce income and wealth inequality (Bird and Zolt 2003; 
De Mooij and Ederveen 2003; Goode 1993; Stewart 2002; Tait 1990; Tanzi and Zee 2000; 
Tanzi 2000; Thirsk 1993). Governments are advised to concentrate on establishing simple, 
predictable and neutral tax systems that will not discourage private enterprise and minimize 
interference with market signals. Specific tax policy changes associated with these reforms 
have included: (a) simplification of tax structures and procedures; (b) the elimination of 
export taxes; (c) reduced tariffs and less reliance on trade taxes; (d) a dual income tax system 
with a simplified progressive tax on labour and a simple, often flat, and fairly low corporate 
tax; and (e) expanded reliance on goods and services taxes, in particular the VAT. 
 
VAT has emerged rapidly to become one of the main modes of revenue raising worldwide. 
First introduced in France in 1948 and in Brazil in 1967, VAT is now in place in more than 
130 countries. Currently, around 80 per cent of the countries in SSA levy a VAT, typically 
raising about one-quarter of all tax revenue (Keen 2012: 11). Because it is such an efficient 
means of extracting tax revenue in countries with good written or electronic records of 
economic transactions, VAT has facilitated trade liberalization by replacing import and 
export taxes, and also contributed strongly to the steady increases in governments’ shares of 
rising national incomes. In poor countries, where governments have traditionally been 
especially dependent on revenue from trade taxes, the promotion of VAT has been even more 
closely tied to trade liberalization.6 
 
In poorer and more agrarian environments where effective ‘tax handles’ are relatively scarce, 
governments find it easier to raise revenue by concentrating their tax collectors on customs 
posts at their borders. Because so many developing countries have fitted into the global 
division of labour as exporters of primary products, international trade has been the obvious 
place for their governments to gather revenue. In 1975, trade taxes were a very minor source 
of government revenue in high income countries, but were significant in both middle and 
low-income countries. An important component of the global tax reform agenda, backed by 
economists’ denunciations of this tax bias against international trade, was the reduction of 
trade taxes and an increasing emphasis on broad based consumption taxes such as the VAT. 
Total trade tax revenue to governments of low-income countries began to decline in the mid-
1980s. Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) estimate that by 2000 governments of middle-income 
countries had found other means to replace about 45-60 per cent of the trade revenues they 
had foregone, while for low-income countries the figure was at best around 30 per cent. 
                                                
5 Goode (1993) provides a review of advice until the early 1990s. He observes (p. 37) that ‘...experts often 
uncritically recommend transplanting the systems of their home countries, perhaps with modifications they have 
unsuccessfully proposed at home’. My own experiences from Tanzania, Uganda and other countries in East and 
Southern Africa over the last two decades indicate that Goode’s observation still is relevant.  
6 See Bird and Gendron (2007) for an extensive discussion of VAT in low-income countries. 
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With regard to total government revenues, the tax reform agenda has not lived up to the 
promise of delivering the revenues that the poorer countries undoubtedly need through 
replacing trade taxes with VAT and by broadening the income tax base while lowering the 
rates. Why they have failed is less clear. The most direct explanation is that in many 
developing countries VAT is harder to collect—unless it is collected at the border like a trade 
tax. Governments that face civil conflict and a variety of other challenges to their authority, 
in general do not have the organizational capacity to make a successful transition to a more 
demanding revenue source. Moreover, the VAT base is often undermined by extensive 
exemptions and zero-rating. The effectiveness of VAT depends in large part on thorough 
bookkeeping and reliable self-assessment. Specialists have long been warning that it would 
not work well in countries where these conditions are not in place. Even within high income 
countries, VAT provides opportunities for fraud and corruption. This does not imply that 
VAT is a wrong tax for poorer countries, but it has probably been extended too widely and 
too fast. The issue now, however, is not whether to remove VAT, but how to improve it.7 
 
A major challenge for building effective, transparent and accountable tax systems are the 
current tax policies in relation to exemptions and tax incentives. Generous investment 
incentives to specific companies, institutions and sectors lead to large revenue losses and 
distorted competition (Keen and Mansour 2010). According to the OECD, tax incentives tend 
to reduce government revenues by 1-2 per cent of GDP (TJN-AA 2012: 14). However, this 
figure is probably at the lower end. A recent study on Tanzania, for instance, suggests that 
exemptions and tax incentives could account for up to 6 per cent of GDP (AfDB 2011: 242). 
In addition to undermining the tax revenue base, a high occurrence of tax exemptions creates 
room for bribery and corruption, and increases the appearance of loopholes for tax evasion 
(Zee et al. 2002).  
 
Proponents of tax incentives often argue that it is imperative to provide tax incentives to 
attract investors, given the generally poor investment climate in poorer countries. This 
position is disputed. In a study using data from a cross section of 80 countries, van Parys and 
James (2009) find that for countries that have a poor investment climate it is ineffective to 
lower the tax rate to compensate for the bad investment climate. Instead, they argue, the 
countries should focus on improving the basic investment climate. A joint report by the IMF, 
OECD, UN and the World Bank (2011) reaches the same conclusion (p. 19): where 
governance is poor, corporate income tax exemptions ‘may do little to attract investment’, 
and when they do, ‘this may well be at the expense of domestic investment’. 
 
While the IMF, OECD, and other multilateral agencies have engaged in the policy dialogue 
on tax exemptions in developing countries, few bilateral agencies are involved, possibly due 
to the fact that they also are benefitting from the current exemption regime. Generally, 
transactions associated with foreign development assistance are exempted (Fjeldstad and 
Moore 2009). Poor countries are often forced to administer a myriad of exemptions that 
typically vary from donor to donor. This places unnecessary burdens on already weak tax 
administrations. Even worse, it fuels a tax-exemption culture and promotes corruption. The 
removal of tax exemptions granted to aid agencies and their employees would help boost the 
credibility of both the government and of donors in relation to building taxpaying cultures. It 
                                                
7 Although the VAT is thought of as a regressive tax, most studies find it to be distributionally neutral (Keen 
2012: 11). According to Zolt and Bird (2005: 1639), VAT is likely to be less regressive than the trade and excise 
taxes it has replaced, and in some developing countries it may be as progressive as the income tax.  
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would also contribute to widening the revenue base and simplifying the tax system. It might 
further improve both budgetary transparency and resource allocation by fully accounting for 
public investment costs. Thus, a step forward would be to abolish exemptions granted donor 
projects and programmes.  
 
Donor support to tax reform has largely focused on the national tax systems. Due to the 
overall fiscal constraints, the reform of the sub-national tax system has not been a priority 
over the mobilization of central government revenues. Local government tax systems in 
many low-income countries, especially in Africa, have remained largely unchanged since 
independence (Brun et al. 2012).8 A widely found characteristic of local government revenue 
systems in Africa is the huge number of revenue instruments in use (Fjeldstad and Heggstad 
2012b; Brosio 2000; Fjeldstad and Semboja 2000). They are often distortive, costly to 
administer, exacerbate inequity, and have an inhibiting effect on the start-up of new 
enterprises and the achievement of economic growth (Bahiigwa et al. 2004). Moreover, there 
is little or no co-ordination with respect to taxation between various levels of government. 
This has partly to do with lack of capacity at any level. At the local level the serious shortage 
of qualified staff at the treasury and planning departments is particularly critical. 
2.2 Creating more effective tax administration  
Ineffective tax administration is often seen as one of the main constraints on the ability of 
states to collect revenues in general and direct taxes in particular (Fjeldstad and Semboja 
2001). Hadler (2000: 10) estimates that better administration of existing tax legislation may 
increase revenue by 30 per cent or more in many countries in SSA. In a famous statement, 
Casanegra de Jantscher (1990) claimed that ‘in developing countries, tax administration is tax 
policy’. However, the opposite is equally true (Keen 2012: 17). Simplification of tax 
legislation and improved tax administration are closely linked. Tax agencies will be more 
effective if their tasks are made more simple, stable and predictable. On the other side, 
questionable options in tax policy sometimes lead to equally questionable administrative 
practices. Exemptions, for instance, not only pose control problems for the  
tax administration, but create opportunities for corruption. In practice, the distinction between 
administration and policy is often hard to make (IMF 2011: 19). But there is no doubt that 
weak and often corrupt revenue administration remains a fundamental barrier to effective and 
fair taxation and to building wider trust between government and citizens in many countries 
(Fjeldstad and Tungodden 2003; Fjeldstad 2009). 
 
During the last two decades, support to tax administrations has been an important part of 
foreign technical assistance to public sector reform in developing countries (von Soest 2007; 
2008; Kloeden 2011). The content of administrative reform in specific countries has 
depended a great deal on what was already in place (Bird et al. 2006; Owens and Hamilton 
2004). Some of the more widespread components are: exploiting new information and 
communication technologies; moving from a system organized around different taxes to one 
organized around localities and/or industries so that individual taxpayers have to deal with 
fewer tax officers; introduction of unique taxpayer identification numbers; establishing 
different offices and procedures for different categories of taxpayers, typically starting with 
                                                
8 Among the exceptions are reforms in East-Africa which have led to the abolishment of so called ‘nuisance’ 
taxes, including poll (head) taxes in Tanzania and Uganda, and simplification of the local tax structure 
(Fjeldstad et al. 2010; Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008). 
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focus on big companies;9 trying to make the collection process more ‘user-friendly’; in some 
countries using commercial banks as collection agents; using audit units more selectively and 
strategically to check on the performance of tax collectors; and, creation of revenue 
authorities across much of Latin America and anglophone Africa (Kloeden 2011; Keen 
2012). 
 
The establishment of semi-autonomous revenue authorities (ARAs) has been a widely noted 
tax administrative innovation during the last two decades. Several aid agencies and 
international financial institutions have concentrated much of their tax work on support for 
the creation and development of ARAs. In particular, the British Government, first through 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and later through the Department for 
International Development (DFID), has been influential in the establishment of revenue 
authorities in anglophone Africa. ODA/DFID have funded UK experts from the British 
revenue administration, Crown Agents and various consulting firms to provide technical 
assistance to tax administrations (Kloeden 2011: 11). Germany (GIZ) has provided technical 
assistance to tax administrative reforms in Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia; the US Treasury to 
Liberia, Nigeria and Uganda; Norway to Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia; Sweden to 
Botswana; Denmark to Tanzania; the European Union to The Gambia and Seychelles; and 
the African Development Bank to several countries, including Liberia and Swaziland. The 
World Bank has been heavily involved in the Tax Modernization Programme in Tanzania 
(Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2011).10 
 
Currently, there are more than 30 autonomous revenue authorities (ARAs) in the developing 
world.11 There is no clear definition of ARAs and they are relatively diverse. Their defining 
feature is (some) autonomy (Taliercio 2004a; b). The choice of the revenue authority model 
aims to remove the revenue collection function partly or fully from the direct control of the 
Ministry of Finance by integrating tax operations into a single purpose agency, and to free the 
tax administration from the constraints of the civil service system (Fjeldstad et al. 2003; 
Fjeldstad and Moore 2009). It is assumed that the revenue authority model will be less 
vulnerable to political interventions in its operations. Moreover, a semi-autonomous revenue 
authority can, in principle, recruit, retain and promote quality staff by paying salaries above 
the civil service regulations, and also more easily dismiss staff. It is expected that such steps 
will provide incentives for greater job motivation and less corruption. In addition, it is 
assumed that the merging of two or more tax agencies that previously have each dealt only 
with one category of revenues can integrate tax operations and focus efforts on collecting 
revenues better than what is possible under civil service rules. A shift to a semi-autonomous 
                                                
9 The IMF has strongly advocated the importance of strengthening large taxpayer administration (Kloeden 
2011: 27). 
10 On occasion the World Bank has been a salesman for ARAs. A review of the 83 projects to reform taxation 
and customs that were financed by the World Bank in the 1990s concluded that: ‘Few projects, however, 
addressed the need for better customer service or tested promising new approaches to taxation, such as 
presumptive taxes, privatized collection or inspection services, or performance-linked bonuses or administrative 
budgets. An exception to this was the support for independent revenue authorities ….’ (World Bank 2000). 
11 In Latin America and the Caribbean, revenue authorities have been established in Jamaica (1981), Argentina 
(1988), Bolivia (1987, re-established in 2001), Peru (1988/1991), Colombia (1991), Venezuela (1993), Mexico 
(1997), Ecuador (1999), Guatemala (1999), and Guyana (2001). In Africa, the revenue authority model has been 
instituted in Ghana (1985; integrated in 2010), Uganda (1991), Zambia (1994), Kenya (1995), Malawi (1995), 
Tanzania (1996), South Africa (1997), Rwanda (1998), Zimbabwe (2001), Ethiopia (2002), Sierra Leone (2002), 
Lesotho (2003), Gambia (2005), Mauritius (2005), Mozambique (2006), Burundi (2010), and Swaziland (2011). 
Angola is in the process of establishing a revenue authority, while Namibia is considering. It is likely that the 
revenue authority model will spread further, especially to francophone Africa.  
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revenue authority model has also been attractive to donors and senior politicians because it 
opens opportunities for more widespread reforms of tax administration (Therkildsen 2004).  
 
Although no formal evaluations exist, there seems to be consensus that the experiences with 
ARAs have been mixed (Kidd and Crandall 2006; Keen 2012: 12; Devas et al. 2001).12 First, 
some ARAs have made impressive advances, for instance Rwanda Revenue Authority, South 
African Revenue Service, Autoridade Tributária de Moçambique (Mozambique Tax 
Authority), and to some extent Tanzania Revenue Authority (House of Commons 2012; 
Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2011). In Mozambique, the tax share increased from 14.1 per cent of 
GDP in 2006 to approximately 19 per cent in 2010 (exclusive non-tax revenue), despite 
reduced import duty rates during the period. Other revenue authorities have seen little 
progress, like in Sierra Leone, or progress has been followed by stagnation like in Zambia, or 
by resurgence like in Uganda (Keen 2012). This may understate real improvements, as 
revenue has largely been sustained despite a decline in both trade tax revenue and income tax 
rates, but it also appears to reflect the relative persistence of corruption and politicization, 
particularly in low-income countries (Fjeldstad 2006; Bird 2008). 
 
The diversity of ARAs is one reason why it is difficult to say whether they are a good thing. 
A second reason is that most are still relatively new and evolving. A third is that, because 
they have been introduced in part at the urging of aid donors and international financial 
institutions, impressionistic interpretations of the evidence for or against them may be 
somewhat tainted (Fjeldstad and Moore 2009). One can understand why autonomous 
agencies were introduced. In environments characterized by large scale corruption and 
politicization of the taxation process, radical institutional reform is very appealing. However, 
we do not know how far this was the right kind of reform. We do know that it has raised 
problems of its own. Anecdotal evidence suggests that managerial and staff capacities often 
have improved (IMF 2011: 20). But the integration of Customs and domestic tax 
administration has proved to be problematic in several countries, partly because some 
functions are unique and partly because of different ‘working cultures’ (Kloeden 2011: 16). 
In Mozambique, for instance, it has proved difficult to effectively integrate Customs, which is 
a uniformed, paramilitary entity, and the domestic tax department (Fjeldstad and Heggstad 
2011). Further, even substantial increases in the salaries of tax officers compared to other 
parts of the public sector still leave these dwarfed by the potential gain from corruption 
(Fjeldstad 2003; Fjeldstad 2006). 
 
Another feature of donor supported tax administrative reforms in recent years is a shift in the 
tax administrations’ attitudes toward taxpayers. Partly stimulated by research on determinants 
of tax compliance, conducted first in the US (Slemrod 1992) and later in other OECD 
countries, including Australia (Braithwaite 2003), ‘customer service’ and ‘user friendliness’ 
have become the norm. National tax administrations have been eagerly opening customer-
friendly ‘one-stop shops’, simplifying procedures, making possible on-line filing of returns, 
and providing extensive information for taxpayers in printed and digital form. Some 
administrations, for instance in Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa and Tanzania, have 
developed innovative methods to deliver key messages to the public, including the use of 
school curricula, secondary school tax clubs, road shows, and media such as radio and 
television (Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2012b). Most administrations have websites, varying from 
outdated static general information through to more dynamic tools (Kloeden 2011: 35). Yet, 
                                                
12 For some case studies, see Chand and Moene (1999), Devas et al. (2001), Fjeldstad (2003, 2006), Talierico 
(2003, 2004b), Terpker (1999), Therkildsen (2004) and Zuleta et al. (2006).  
  9
it is evident that much of the new ‘user friendliness’ of many tax administrations is so far 
mainly window dressing: taxpayers continue to experience extortion, bribery and 
obstructiveness rather than willing, responsive service (Fjeldstad and Moore 2009). It is also 
clear that ‘user friendliness’ is most widely practiced in the relations between tax 
administrations and their larger corporate clients. 
 
For smaller and middle-sized formal sector businesses, tax enforcement strategies applied by 
revenue officers are perceived to be a major problem in many countries. Frequent and unco-
ordinated tax audits are considered to be harassment and intimidation tactics to force 
taxpayers into extra-legal compliance (von Soest 2006). Discretion leads to unpredictable tax 
bills, arbitrary fines, and corrupt practices. Some foreign-owned enterprises also report such 
tax administrative practices. In a study on tax reform and business environment in 
Mozambique, Nathan Associates (2004: 36) report ‘… rampant negotiations with tax officers; 
companies driven out of business by competitors who pay bribes in lieu of taxes; a company 
that sought clarification from one tax official only to be fined by another; a foreign enterprise 
that was hit with an enormous fine for a violation that did not exist, according to his attorney; 
and businesses that encountered unexplained re-assessments and penalties’.  
 
What is the rationale behind the discretionary implementation of the tax code? Observers 
believe that tax officers levy arbitrary assessments in order to meet revenue targets. Structural 
and administrative features of the tax system add to the problem. Many smaller, but also 
many middle-sized enterprises, lack the skills required to provide minimally acceptable 
accounts and accurate information on total sales. This is an open invitation for discretion and 
negotiation by tax officers. In particular, frontline staff in the customs and the domestic 
revenue departments are exposed to and involved in corruption. According to the Bribe 
Payers Index 2008, the customs administration is perceived by business executives to be one 
of the most corrupt sectors of government in many African countries (TI 2008). This is 
supported by the Afrobarometer survey, covering a large number of sub-Saharan African 
countries, which finds that the most discredited institutions are the police and the tax 
administration, including customs (Lavallée et al. 2008). This situation is partly compounded 
by the fact that, in spite of comprehensive tax reforms over the last decade, the tax structures 
and administrative procedures are still complex and time consuming for businesses in many 
countries. This facilities corruption and extortion, and contributes to retard the process of 
building a tax culture based on transparency and accountability.  
 
These observations highlight a wider problem—the extent to which improvements in revenue 
performance results from a focus on formal sector corporations by the tax administrations, at 
the potential expense of genuinely broadening the tax base. Thus, improvements in revenue 
collection may not reflect the development of a broad-based fiscal contract between the state 
and society, but the fact that the revenue administration is targeting its efforts towards the few 
most revenue productive taxpayers.  
 
The argument made above is all the more pointed in situations where national governments 
are under strong pressure from the IMF and donors to meet revenue targets. Often the tax 
administrations respond with some combination of (a) an even tighter squeeze on registered 
taxpayers; and (b) quasi-military ‘raids’ on other businesses on which they do not have 
detailed information. By pushing for unrealistically high revenue targets, the Ministry of 
Finance, the IMF and donor agencies may contribute to undermine the reputation and 
credibility of the tax revenue administration in the eyes of the public. Attempts to meet 
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externally set tax-to-GDP targets may undermine democratic accountability if legal processes 
and taxpayers’ rights are set aside in response (Luoga 2002).  
2.3 Encouraging constructive state-society engagement around taxes 
Tax systems can potentially contribute to shaping accountability relationships between the 
state and citizens, and strengthening state capacities (Braütigam et al. 2008; Ayee et al. 
2010). Taxation is one of the few objective measures of the power and legitimacy of the state. 
First, taxes are the primary platform for political negotiations amongst the country’s 
stakeholders. Second, bargaining over taxes is central to building relations of accountability 
between the state and citizens based on mutual rights and obligations. This implies that taxes 
should be levied as consensually and as transparently as possible. Third, for taxation to have 
a positive effect on accountability taxes must be ‘felt’ by a majority of citizens, to secure that 
tax issues become prominent on the public political agenda (Moore 2008). This is about 
building a taxpaying culture (Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2012a). However, while donors and tax 
practitioners seem to acknowledge the importance of these issues, they have yet to be 
translated into a clear-cut governance focused tax reform agenda in practice.  
 
Common features of the tax systems in many developing countries are that the number of 
registered taxpayers is small and relatively few medium-sized and large enterprises account 
for the majority of tax revenue. In Tanzania, for instance, with a total population of more than 
45 million people, the number of taxpayers registered in the Taxpayer Identification System 
(TIN) was about 400,000 in 2008 (Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2011). In November 2010, less 
than 400 large taxpayers contributed about 80 per cent of total domestic revenue collection. 
The revenue base generally excludes the large number of small and micro enterprises, as well 
as many professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, and private consultants. Furthermore, the 
political and economic elite generally do not pay taxes. 
 
A large share of the economic activity in poor countries is located within the informal 
sector.13 That sector is hard to tax (Tendler 2002; Bird and Wallace 2003; Kloeden 2006). 
Tax administrations tend to give it little priority, because returns to effort may be low in cash 
terms, and collection is likely to be difficult and unpleasant (Fjeldstad and Moore 2008). 
From economic and administrative perspectives, it makes a great deal of sense not to tax 
multitudes of poor people. The VAT system generally exempts basic goods consumed 
heavily by the poor, and the income tax code generally excludes individuals earning less than 
a certain amount per year. As a matter of administrative reality, informal entities with 
incomes below this threshold are not in the tax net. 
 
One should not expect that large amounts of revenue can be raised by taxing micro 
enterprises. A study by Ernst & Young, for instance, notes that more than 13,000 enterprises 
were registered for the normal VAT regime in Mozambique in 2004, and more than 10,000 
were registered for the simplified regime, while nearly 12,000 were recorded in the exempt 
regime (Nathan Associates Inc. 2004: 27-28). Yet, those filing under the simplified regime 
accounted for just 0.4 per cent of the revenue. Thus, Terkper (2003) and others argue that the 
tax system can be improved by having tax officers concentrate on handling a few thousand 
                                                
13 The size of the informal economy is hard to estimate. Recent estimates from West Africa suggest that more 
than 80 per cent of total employment is informal and up to 60 per cent of GDP is produced by informal activities 
(Benjamin and Mbaye 2012: 48).  
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files efficiently, rather than trying to cover tens of thousands of very small taxpayers. 
According to the IMF, there is a strong case for raising the thresholds for tax coverage, which 
would actually narrow the coverage of the tax base, but with little effect on revenue (Keen 
2012; IMF 2011).  
 
However, the removal from the tax net of taxpayers who generate little net revenue is 
contrary to the emphasis within the tax reform programme to broadening the tax net. A wider 
tax net is not always a good thing, but there is reason for concern that tax reforms have been 
driven by an economic calculus that emphasizes the advantages of excluding marginal 
payers. The political arguments for inclusion have not been heard. This would be less of a 
problem if the actual tax burdens in poor countries were fairly and effectively distributed. But 
they are not. In particular, as noted above, they often fall heavily on a small number of 
registered, formal sector companies. Thus, it makes sense to question the dominance of 
economic arguments for excluding smaller taxpayers from the tax net on pure efficiency 
grounds, and to explore the potential political advantages of widening that net. From a state-
building perspective broadening the revenue base is vital to building the social fiscal contract. 
It is also central to creating an equitable tax regime.  
 
A major challenge for many developing countries is to broaden the revenue base and thus 
increasing public income without raising the tax levels. In this perspective, there are good 
public policy reasons for paying more attention to taxing informal urban economic activity, 
both in terms of broadening of the tax net and exploring alternative ways of building the 
capacity to tax the sector more effectively in the long term (Fjeldstad and Moore 2008). 
Finding better ways of taxing the informal sector, however, is in practice not high on the tax 
reform agenda in most revenue authorities in developing countries. There are frequent 
mentions of the need to ‘broaden the tax base’, but this seems to refer more to closing 
loopholes than to any notion that the informal sector needs to be tackled as a generic issue.  
3 Improving donor efforts: challenges and priorities 
The broad tax policy and administrative reforms discussed in the previous section have been 
widely adopted with little protest or overt debate.14 The reforms have passed as ‘necessary 
modernization’ of an essentially technical character. The adaptation of the tax reform agenda 
by many developing countries reflects both donor pressure and the growth of global 
epistemic communities of tax professionals with shared ideas about reform priorities (Stewart 
2002). The reforms mirror a significant convergence in the features of developing country tax 
systems (IMF 2011). This convergence indicates a degree of success of external support. It is 
important, however, to recognize that the more successful aspects of recent tax reform efforts 
have not just been externally driven. Yet, there seems to be a broad acceptance of the need 
for greater attention to local leadership, locally designed solutions and donor approaches that 
are sensitive to each country specific socio-economic environment.  
 
While donor support has contributed to ‘broad’ reform and convergence over time, some 
observers question the ‘depth’ of these reforms (Prichard et al. 2012a). In spite of advances in 
many respects, substantial deficiencies in terms of (a) realization of the revenue potential; (b) 
                                                
14 It is true that there have been anti-VAT riots, with deaths, in both Ghana and Uganda (Fjeldstad and Moore 
2008). The structural reason is that VAT imposes major tax compliance costs on small businesses. In Ghana the 
riots can be attributed to political mismanagement: too rapid an introduction, with inadequate consultation with 
the small traders most adversely affected. 
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administrative capacity to taxing growing sectors; and (c) governance remain in many 
developing countries. A range of factors contributes to these deficiencies. They include a 
legacy of coercive and centralized tax systems; weak tax compliance by elites; large, untaxed 
informal sectors; ineffective local government tax systems; inconsistent patterns of business 
taxation; and limited administrative experience and expertise to effectively tax growing 
sectors such as extractive industries, tourism, telecommunication, banks and finance 
institutions. The picture that emerges of reform efforts is that they have yielded significant 
formal changes in tax regimes across the developing world, but more modest changes in tax 
practices.  
 
Addressing these challenges would not represent an abandonment of existing strategies. It 
would, however, imply changes in the priorities of donor supported tax reform efforts. 
Questions about inclusiveness, equity, transparency, and local government taxation should 
have a more prominent role in reforms (Prichard et al. 2012a: 7-8). Achieving such a 
reordering of priorities will require (a) an effort to ‘open-up’ tax reform processes to new 
stakeholders, and (b) the development of a broader range of performance indicators against 
which tax reform efforts are measured. As long as tax performance is judged largely by 
comparatively short-term changes in the tax-to-GDP ratio, these ‘softer’ elements of the 
reform agenda are unlikely to be given priority. There is a need for reform programmes that 
explicitly prioritize a broader range of issues, including transparency, inclusiveness and 
equity, if external actors are to foster positive connections between taxation and broader 
governance outcomes (Prichard et al. 2012a). 
 
How can donors support developing countries’ efforts to enhance domestic revenues 
efficiently, effectively and equitably, and contribute to develop tax systems that promote 
economic growth and good governance? Such an agenda would include efforts to 
strengthening (i) tax policy design; (ii) tax administrative capacity; and (iii) governance, 
including fairness, predictability, transparency and accountability. I now discuss each of these 
in turn. 
3.1 Strengthening tax policy 
Tax policy represents a main obstacle for the development of effective tax systems in many 
developing countries. Tax policy challenges include: 
 
Exemptions and tax incentives 
 
Generous investment incentives to specific industries have led to large revenue losses and 
distorted competition in many poor countries (see section 2.1). In particular, influential 
corporations and wealthy individuals constantly seek ways to take advantage of special tax 
breaks to shelter income that should be fully taxed. However, rather than uniting to demand 
fair deals with investors, developing countries, particularly in SSA, are competing with each 
other to see who has the best business climate, the most generous tax holidays, the best 
investor protection and other fiscal incentives. Challenges related to international taxation 
include the impacts of preferential tax regimes and special economic zones on private 
investment, and on the legitimacy of national tax systems. Tax holidays, which are time-
limited exemptions from corporate income tax, are open to abuse, undermine tax revenue by 
providing corporations with a strong incentive to use transfer mispricing and financial 
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arrangements. Even the most developed tax administrations have difficulties dealing with 
such abuse. 
 
Experience shows that a high occurrence of tax exemptions reduces the tax base, creates 
room for bribery and corruption, and increases the appearance of loopholes for tax evasion. 
Obstacles to address these challenges are frequently rooted in politics, rather than in the 
absence of local understanding or donor funding. Hence, the extent of tax exemptions is often 
an indication of a government’s political will to strengthen the fiscal contract and fight fiscal 
corruption and tax evasion. Strong will and commitment by the political leadership is a pre-
requisite to achieving this shift in culture. However, due to resistance from the benefiting 
elite, political leaders and businesses, the exemption regime is likely to remain a major 
challenge in the short to medium term. Co-ordinated efforts from the international 
community should therefore focus particularly on supporting and encouraging local efforts to 
overcome these political barriers. Currently, ordinary citizens and enterprises in donor 
countries are subsidising the political and economic (tax exempted) elite in developing 
countries through their tax payments. The removal of tax exemptions granted to aid agencies 
and their employees would help boost the credibility of donors’ efforts to reduce exemptions 
and strengthen the tax systems in poorer countries.  
 
Informal sector and sub-national taxation 
 
There are good public policy reasons for paying more attention to taxing informal urban 
economic activities and to strengthening sub-national tax systems. This is essentially about 
fostering more broad based engagement around tax issues while also providing the fiscal 
foundation for successful decentralization and the development of small businesses. Recent 
years have witnessed increasing attention to the question of how to effectively tax large and 
growing informal sectors in the developing world (Prichard et al. 2012b). While this has been 
driven in part by the desire to raise greater revenue, in reality the revenue potential of the 
small informal business sector will remain modest. Many national tax administrations know 
that, and in effect do not really pursue the issues with much vigour—beyond introducing new 
types of presumptive tax regimes for small business, that may or may not be implemented on 
the ground. This is understandable from their perspective. But more effective taxation of the 
informal sector is an important long term goal, for reasons of equity and broader ‘tax morale’, 
to protect existing revenue bases, and to encourage formalization in a way that supports 
economic growth and broader governance gains.  
 
In contrast with important progress at the national level, sub-national taxation has been 
relatively neglected and requires further attention in most poor countries. Despite significant 
moves towards decentralization in several developing countries, fiscal decentralization has 
been limited and not very successful (Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2012a). This effectively 
reduces the decision-making power and autonomy of local governments. Recent research also 
highlights the absence of links between local revenue raising and the responsiveness or 
accountability of local governments in Africa (Brun et al. 2012). While the introduction of 
semi-autonomous revenue authorities in much of anglophone Africa has had significant 
positive impacts in terms of public sector institution building, there is no equivalent progress 
in relation to local government revenue rising. In this perspective, a major challenge is how 
to improve co-operation between central and local governments on tax issues, including 




Weak links between tax reforms and other public sector reforms 
 
Commonly, several public sector reforms are on-going in developing countries. They include 
political, electoral, civil service, legal, judicial, local government, budgetary and tax reforms. 
The problem is that there often is a weak link between tax reforms and other public sector 
reforms (Ayee et al. 2010). Such a link is necessary to ensure a holistic approach which is 
needed for co-ordination, information sharing and good practices. One of the principal 
reasons for the limited success of many reforms is the implicit presumption that the weakness 
of public administration is managerial and could be remedied in a straightforward 
technocratic manner through a combination of organizational overhaul and financial support 
to procure the requisite specialist technical advice, training and hardware. However, a central 
lesson is that public administrations are embedded in a complex, interdependent system 
(Levy 2004). This system incorporates not only the bureaucratic apparatus as a whole, but 
also political institutions and social, economic, and political interests more broadly.  
 
Better understanding of the political nature of taxation is required 
 
While the technical aspects of tax reform are crucial, a better understanding of the 
sustainability of tax reforms is not possible without a better understanding of how reforms 
become legitimate. Because taxation affects incentives and distribution simultaneously, tax 
reform requires either a degree of social consensus that taxation is in the collective interest 
and/or it requires a state with the ability to coerce those who challenge its allocations. The 
focus therefore on institutional designs and other technical issues is incomplete since it 
ignores the political nature of taxation. More emphasis on the political economy of taxation is 
required for designing and implementing effective tax systems. 
3.2 Strengthening tax administrative capacity 
Donor support to tax administrations has contributed to build capacity in a range of areas, 
including human resources, internal audits and integration of tax departments. Currently, the 
need for further technical assistance is particularly related to the development of expertise 
within areas such as specialized audit functions of large taxpayers in growing sectors, such as 
extractive industries, telecommunications, the banking and finance sectors, and tourism. 
Further, there is a need to strengthen efforts measures that aim to improve voluntary 
compliance, including taxpayer education, dialogue forums between taxpayers and the tax 
administration, e-taxation, as well as measures to improve the integrity of tax officers.  
 
International taxation and capital flight 
 
It is increasingly recognized that the effectiveness of tax systems in the developing world is 
shaped by the broader international context. It is well documented by research that illicit 
capital flows from developing countries—mainly to tax havens and Western financial 
institutions—are huge. The proceeds of commercial tax evasion, mainly through trade 
mispricing, are found to be by far the largest component (Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2010). 
Challenges of taxing extractive industries have been exposed in the literature (Daniel et al. 
2010). The problems are also serious in renewable sectors such as fisheries, forestry and 
wildlife, although these have received limited attention.  
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Transfer mispricing is a challenge that adversely affects domestic resource mobilization. This 
challenge is linked to current reporting standards for transnational corporations, and 
international information sharing arrangements between tax administrations. Most extractive 
industries companies operate internationally and have extended dealings with affiliated 
companies. This increases the opportunities for transfer pricing and lowers the tax liability. 
This further complicates the task of tax administration and creates a challenge that needs 
specific skills to deal with. Although the tax laws may have legal provisions to address the 
issue, that is not sufficient. Tax administration needs better training on how to recognize the 
transfer mispricing opportunities in mining operations and stronger capacity to detect and 
respond to this problem. There is also a need for more in-depth knowledge of the extent and 
impacts of capital flight at the country levels. The issue of abusive transfer pricing is 
sophisticated and complex in nature. International collaboration and treaties are required to 
make inroads against the problem. There are opportunities for donor support to increase 
international co-operation among tax agencies and to change the accounting rules for 
transnational business, in order to reduce the degree of tax evasion that takes place, which is 
evident in natural resource rich developing countries. 
 
Information and communication technology (ICT) to enhance administrative efficiency 
 
The revenue administrations in many developing countries have initiated—with donor 
support—an array of initiatives to exploit ICT with a view to enhancing efficiency in tax 
administration. These include, for instance, the ASYCUDA++ for customs; eFiling for 
domestic revenue; computerized registration of motor vehicles and drivers; and introduction 
of electronic cash registers for VAT. Such initiatives are at different stages of implementation 
in different countries. However, the effectiveness of such systems depends on building and 
maintaining technical and professional capacity to operate and maintain the systems. At 
present, these systems are commonly not being implemented using an integrated framework. 
This can be blamed on the technical and managerial challenges this approach poses, but also 
on poor donor co-ordination. Yet, in the absence of integration, the use of the systems will 
remain sub-optimal. In particular, it is difficult to have a single view of the taxpayer outside 
an integrated system.  
 
‘Balancing’ the performance indicators 
 
A more comprehensive diagnostic tool for tax administrations, based on performance 
indicators and agreed benchmarks, is required. The uncompromising focus on revenue target 
in the tax administrations implies that achieving the collective target becomes not 
‘everything’, but the ‘only thing’—sometimes also at ‘any cost’, to the detriment of other 
goals of the tax administration. The increasing emphasis by governments and donors on 
domestic revenue enhancement, as well as the establishment of regional bodies such as the 
African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), aiming to support the development of effective 
tax systems, underlines this need. Performance measurement is important for both 
accountability and to promoting a culture of effectiveness in the tax administration. This issue 
is also raised by the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Secretariat,15 
which in 2010 commissioned a feasibility study on a tool to assess tax administration 
performance (Crandall 2010). In particular, there is a need for striking a balance between 
                                                
15 PEFA is a partnership programme of the World Bank, the European Commission, the UK Department for 
International Development, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Monetary Fund.  
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revenue and service targets (Nathan Associates Inc. 2009; Kariuki 2012). Performance 
criteria should be linked to taxpayers’ satisfaction with the revenue administration, number of 
declarations processed by type of tax, processing time per declaration, processing time for 
refund requests, number of audits per audit staff and type of contributor; per cent of audits 
finalized and accepted by taxpayer without contest, the number of taxpayers enrolled in the 
tax bases, etc.  
 
A standardized assessment system, if properly implemented, can be used to (i) compare a 
country’s tax system with a regional or international set of norms or comparators, and (ii) 
compare the condition and performance of a country’s tax system over time. This may lead to 
better structured reform programmes that properly address issues of performance. It may also 
facilitate collaboration and better co-ordination between donors, as well as enhanced 
ownership of reform efforts by countries. There are, of course, risks involved, in particular 
with respect to complexity and inflexibility of performance measures, which may lead to 
incorrect conclusions or distort the behaviour of tax officers.16  
3.3 Strengthening tax governance  
A key challenge is to strengthen accountability between government and taxpayers. The 
channels through which governments hold themselves accountable to citizens, and citizens 
communicate their demands for better government, are still highly dysfunctional in many 
developing countries. 
 
Strengthening taxpayers’ rights 
 
An important element of administrative accountability is the rights of taxpayers vis-à-vis the 
tax authority. Though still in their infancy in many developing countries, tax appeal boards 
and tax tribunals are important institutions to secure taxpayers’ rights and to establish fair and 
transparent procedures to address tax disputes. To make these institutions accessible for a 
wider segment of taxpayers, there is a need to simplify the procedures for instituting appeals, 
and to disseminate more accessible information to the general public on the roles and 
functions of the appeal board.  
 
Fighting corruption in tax collection 
 
Generally, the issue of integrity is high on the agenda of revenue administrations. 
Institutional mechanisms are often established to prevent, reveal and curb corruption. 
However, the critical tasks are to ensure that the systems, policies, regulations and procedures 
are not only established, but also filter down throughout the organization. There also seem to 
be an endemic tax avoidance culture in many tax administrations, and some tax officers seem 
to encourage or fall victim to this culture. Therefore, continuous vigilance on the part of 
revenue administrations’ leadership will be crucial to minimizing corruption in tax collection.  
 
  
                                                
16 Serra (2003) reports that evaluation of tax auditors in Chile based on the level of fines issued led to many 
doubtful tax assessments that caused huge costs to taxpayers during the early 1990s. Thus, the implementation 
of simplified performance measures should be preceded by a thorough analysis of their implications on tax 
officers’ behaviour. 
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Poor taxpaying culture 
 
The tax-paying culture in most low-income countries is generally weak. Some of the reasons 
for this attitude are the legacy of taxation being seen as coercive and the inability of taxpayers 
to see the relationship between provision of public goods and services and taxes paid. There 
seems to have been a general lack of concern for the historical evidence about the connection 
between taxation and state-building. There is a need to construct tax systems that engage 
citizens in politics in a positive way, and contribute to the legitimacy of the state (Fjeldstad 
and Moore 2008: 259). 
 
A large proportion of the economic active citizens in poor countries belong to the informal 
sector, both in rural and urban areas. This has affected ‘tax literacy’ as many people are not 
able to comprehend the technical issues involved in tax administration and reform. Many 
revenue authorities in Africa have undertaken vigorous taxpayer education interventions, but 
they have had a limited outreach since most of them have been concentrated in the urban 
centres. Similarly, some elites are tax illiterate because they are not interested in tax issues. 
They regard taxation as a form of coercion and one that will erode their privileges. They 
therefore turn a deaf ear to the taxpayer education campaigns of tax administrations. How to 
establish a constructive dialogue with elites on taxation and development remains an 
unsettled challenge. 
 
Securing better links between taxes paid and public service provision 
 
This involves asking the question: why should people pay taxes? For taxpayers, paying taxes 
to the state is a quid pro quo, that is, they expect public services to be provided. It is basically 
‘tax for services’. People are more likely to pay taxes if they felt that the government was 
providing services equitably, collecting revenue fairly and using the revenue to provide 
services (Fjeldstad 2004). Still, there is a tendency for the revenue and expenditure sides of 
the public finance equation to be treated as separate silos. The links between tax payment and 
public service delivery is generally weak in many developing countries, which is reflected in 
widespread resistance to pay taxes. Citizen surveys conducted in various African countries 
commonly reflect the view that people perceive they receive little in return for taxes paid 
(Fjeldstad et al. 2012). Poor service delivery, in taxpayers’ view, legitimizes tax evasion and 
avoidance. The weak link between taxes paid and services provided is likely to erode 
citizens’ trust in government.  
 
Is earmarking of taxes required to enhance compliance and build a taxpaying culture? The 
attraction of tax earmarking is that it can regularize spending on essential tasks and create 
greater transparency about the connection between taxation and public spending. However, 
much of the public finance literature and many fiscal experts advise against earmarking (Bird 
1992; Bird and Jun 2005).17 One reason is that tax earmarking reduces fiscal flexibility in the 
long-term. Perhaps more importantly, in practice, many tax earmarks serve a political 
purpose, but do not actually affect spending patterns or improve monitoring. The most 
common problem arises from the fact that revenues are highly fungible, meaning that newly 
earmarked revenues can be offset by shifting existing revenues to other priorities, thus 
                                                
17 In practice, many countries use tax earmarking to some degree. Bird (1984) found that over half of all central 
government revenue in Colombia was earmarked. According to Rajkumar (2004), the percentage of national 
revenues earmarked for specific purposes in Brazil rose from 30 per cent a few decades ago to almost 80 per 
cent by the end of the 1990s. 
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leaving the aggregate pattern of spending unchanged (Prichard 2010). Such behaviour can 
actually undermine public confidence in the tax system if it is perceived to be manipulative.  
 
Despite these critiques, there may be a strong case for the use of tax earmarking in 
developing countries. From a governance perspective, tax earmarking could be a useful 
strategy to build trust between the state and citizens, achieve important revenue and spending 
objectives, improve monitoring of tax and expenditures, and encourage public engagement. 
 
Strengthening parliaments’ capacity 
 
Although the legislature plays a role in designing tax policies through debating budget 
statements and tax bills, the disturbing aftermath of passing the bills has raised questions as to 
whether legislators in poorer countries really understand tax policies and the implications of 
tax reforms for their constituents. Through co-ordinated efforts donors should consider 
providing advice, training and research support to improve the technical capacity and basic 
skills of Members of Parliament in public finance and tax policy. Priority should be given to 
members of the Finance and Economic Affairs Committee and the Public Accounts 
Committee. Second, there is a need to increase the time available for scrutiny of the budget 
proposals. Third, more user-friendly information on tax reforms should be provided at an 
earlier stage of the budget cycle. For instance, the Economic Association of Zambia (EAZ) 
and Revenue Watch in Tanzania, with donor support, have organized training seminars for 
Parliamentarians on the ‘basics of taxation’ and how to read and understand budgets. This 
model could be extended to include a range of tax related issues. 
 
Encouraging civil society engagement 
 
Civil society actors are likely to be crucial intermediaries in fostering state-society bargaining 
around taxation. An important opportunity for building political support for reform lies in 
more emphasis on the ‘demand side’, i.e. in building broader citizen engagement around 
taxation. Public debates on taxation in many developing countries are to a large extent limited 
to taxation of multinational companies. While this is important, a broader engagement about 
the tax and public expenditure system is missing. This is also reflected in Parliamentary 
debates on taxation. Through co-ordinated efforts, donors should consider to enhance their 
support to domestic civil society organizations engaged on tax issues. There is also demand 
for technical assistance to building tax capacity/knowledge in the business communities, 
especially for small and medium enterprises. 
 
Building local research capacity 
 
Building local research capacity to inform policy reforms should be one component in donor 
efforts on tax and development. There is a need to strengthen the more general analytical 
capacity within the revenue authorities in many countries. African Tax Administration Forum 
(ATAF), which is supported by development agencies, might be a productive entry-point in 
the African context. In the short term this will require the involvement of 
external/international researchers since only few researchers in developing countries at 
present are specialized on taxation. A natural extension of this would be to build regional, 
and in some cases national, academic courses or degrees on natural resource management and 
taxation. This could be done by the International Centre for tax and development 
(www.ICTD.ac) in partnership with the African Tax Institute (ATI) at the University of 
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Pretoria (www.ati.up.ac.za); with national and regional research institutions like the African 
Economic Research Consortium (AERC) in Nairobi (www.aercafrica.org). 
 
A longer-term strategy to increase knowledge and dialogue on tax issues at a more advanced 
level is to inspire students to choose topics related to taxation for their university degrees. 
Student organizations and/or other civil society organizations can promote tax and capital 
flight as important areas to study. Thus, the seeds for increased and improved knowledge on 
taxation can be planted. Experiences from entrepreneurship and innovation studies in 
Western Europe show that the academic staff in many colleges and universities has been 
drawn into the field by the keen interest of the students they are supervising.18 
4 Knowledge gaps and issues for further research  
Although specific tax policy decisions normally are—and should be—debated and contested, 
there is considerable agreement at the international level about what are the important tax 
issues and appropriate tax policy directions for developing countries.19 Much of this relative 
consensus is reflected in the IMF’s latest policy statement ‘Revenue Mobilization in 
Developing Countries’ (IMF 2011). Some of the main components are: 
 
• The governments of many developing countries need to increase domestic revenues 
substantially to fund major social and infrastructure needs. 
 
• Revenue is not the sole concern; it is important to take into consideration the impacts the 
level and composition of taxes can have on economic efficiency and long-run growth (via 
investment, human capital acquisition, and innovation) and equity.  
 
• The general direction of recent national level tax reform, including the relative shift from 
trade taxes to VAT and the emphasis on improving tax administration, is broadly correct. 
 
• The process of improving tax systems will continue to be slow and incremental. 
 
• In many countries, poorer citizens bear too much of the tax burden and the very wealthy 
bear too little. 
 
• Tax exemptions, and especially tax holidays which are time-limited exemptions from the 
corporate income tax, are among the most damaging single bad tax practice. A high 
occurrence of tax exemptions reduces the tax base, creates room for bribery and 
corruption, and increases the appearance of loopholes for tax evasion. 
 
• Private investment is more likely to respond positively to more predictable, unambiguous 
tax policies and practices than to specific changes in tax regimes. 
 
• Globalization continuously provides new opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion. In 
particular, profit-shifting by multinational companies is an increasing concern. 
                                                
18 Tax Justice Network–Norway uses this approach to encourage Norwegian students to focus on tax and 
capital flight in their bachelor and master studies. 
19 This section has benefitted substantially from discussions with and inputs from my research colleagues Mick 
Moore and Wilson Prichard at the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD).  
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• Tax policy and practices may have significant implications for the quality of governance. 
More efficient, fairer, and less corrupt tax systems can spearhead improvement in wider 
governance relations. 
 
The most important single thing that we do not know is how to implement the kinds of policy 
changes listed or implied above in the environments typical for poor countries. The consensus 
summarized above is largely among tax policy experts over what, from a technical 
perspective, governments should do. That leaves open the practical question of what can be 
done, in the face of opposition from interest groups of various kinds, and through tax 
administrations that are themselves often inefficient and resistant to change. 
 
Current major knowledge gaps can be grouped into three broader areas that aim to achieve 
better understanding of (a) the politics of tax reform; (b) relations between taxation, 
governance and state-building; and (c) links between taxation and economic growth. More 
specifically: 
 
(a) The politics of tax reform 
 
Understanding the politics of reform is essential to effectively pursue the goals associated 
with it: promoting economic growth, raising revenue, expanding equity and strengthening 
governance. Research should aim to examine what reforms and reform strategies seem to 
have been most successful, and why. How can donors best support national revenue raising 
activities? Another key question is how the governments of poorer developing countries can 
capture a larger fraction of the significant rents that accrue from the exploitation of 
petroleum, mining, forestry and fisheries resources. What are the best ways of aligning tax 
systems with the needs of the private sector without undermining the capacity to raise 
adequate revenue? How viable are current proposals to reduce international tax evasion 
through changes in the reporting rules for transnational businesses and improvements in 
information exchange between tax authorities? What advice can researchers offer reformers, 
drawing not only on country specific knowledge, but also on comparative experiences and 
frameworks? Surprisingly little is known about taxpayer perceptions and experiences in low-
income countries (Fjeldstad et al. 2012). In particular, there is a need to acquire more 
knowledge of the élites willingness to pay taxes in developing countries. Do ordinary citizens 
and élites have similar perceptions of taxation in a given country? The tax behaviour of the 
elite is likely to have a much bigger impact on tax morale than their low absolute numbers in 
terms of the taxpaying population would suggest, if their behaviour influences the attitudes of 
all. Work in this area should focus on enhancing our understanding of taxpayer experiences, 
through a combination of survey and case study evidence. This information will not only 
inform tax reform strategies, but will also provide a lens into differences in taxpayer 
experiences across groups (e.g. gender or ethnicity) and into understanding the micro basis 
for connections between tax payment and broader demands for improved governance. How 
can tax systems best be reformed to increase equity in specific countries? Issues that rarely 
are addressed in debates about taxation and equity, include gender impacts of tax practices, 
particularly unintended ones. These may have a significant effect on inequality and its 




(b) Taxation, governance and state-building 
 
It is increasingly understood that effective tax systems can be a catalyst for improvements in 
broader state capacity and strengthen ties between governments and citizens. However, the 
specifics of these relationships remain underexplored. Research should aim to provide 
concrete and policy relevant evidence about the nature of these connections, when they are 
likely and how they can be strengthened, including: How to design and implement effective 
revenue raising systems for sub-national governments? The issue has received little serious 
policy attention. How to design and implement effective revenue raising systems for the large 
informal sectors populated by small and micro-enterprises? While taxation is not the only 
obstacle for business formalization, high tax rates and compliance costs are commonly listed 
among the core reasons for working in the informal economy. What can be done to change 
these incentives? What scope is there for progress in reducing the administrative burden? 
What are the barriers to doing so in tax administrations?  
 
(c) Taxation and economic growth 
 
While we know quite a lot about the ways in which tax policy and practices might undermine 
economic growth, there is little evidence on the ways in which tax systems might be designed 
positively to accelerate growth. It is important to avoid the temptation to seek general 
conclusions about how taxation might affect growth—or any other policy objective—without 
paying close attention to its interaction in specific contexts with other economic policy 
instruments, with politics and with the financial conditions under which private investment 
decisions are made. Empirical research on tax and growth should include: (i) efforts to 
mobilize new empirical evidence on the impacts of different corporate tax policies, and tax 
incentives and exemptions, (ii) understand the impacts of taxation, and informal sector and 
local government taxation in particular, on growth and formalization among small and 
medium enterprises, (iii) extend work looking at the implications of tax administration and 
tax related corruption, and (iv) explore the political incentives for policymakers to promote 
economic growth that are created by alternative revenue structures, particularly at the local 
government level.  
5 Concluding remarks 
This paper has reviewed experiences with donor support to strengthen tax systems in 
developing countries. Challenges and priorities to improve donor efforts are discussed. 
Knowledge gaps are identified and issues for further research on tax for development are 
suggested. The paper has argued that the challenge for many developing countries is not only 
to tax more (i.e. to increase the tax to-GDP ratio), but to tax a larger number of citizens and 
enterprises more consensually and to encourage constructive state-citizen engagement around 
taxation. This is not easy for various reasons, including economic structure and history. 
Nonetheless, historical and contemporary experiences show that taxpayers’ behaviour can be 
transformed by reforming the tax and expenditure system, leading to both a greater 
willingness to pay and an increased propensity to mobilize demand for better public services. 
The paper emphasizes the importance of local leadership, locally designed solutions and 
donor approaches that are sensitive to each country specific socio-economic environment. In 
setting priorities, the starting point for donors must be an understanding of the context in 
which tax reforms are being pursued and donor support is being provided.  
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There is now a much wider appreciation of the importance of taxation in development, and 
many more development agencies and governments are active in the field. Unfortunately, this 
poses serious problems of duplication and fragmentation, which may undermine reform 
efforts by diverting local capacities, reducing local ownership and undermining the coherence 
of reform programmes. Thus, donor co-ordination and co-operation should be supported. 
International Tax Compact argues that development agencies need to increase the level of 
information sharing to secure that assistance is complementary and aligned (ITC 2012: 50-4). 
Information exchange and co-ordination would also allow for an improved division of labour 
between donors. The fact that multiple organizations work in the same country or regional 
context or on identical thematic issues indicates that there is a high potential for a more 
focused approach. An improved division of labour may also contribute to build up more in 
depth expertise with respect to the regional or country-specific background, as well as in 
terms of technical knowledge.  
References 
AfDB (2011). ‘Domestic Resource Mobilization for Poverty Reduction in East Africa: 
Lessons for Tax Policy and Administration’. Tunis: The Knowledge and Information 
Center (KVRC), African Development Bank. 
Ayee, J., O.-H. Fjeldstad, L. Marais, and A. Keanly (2010). ‘Good Tax Governance in 
Africa’. Prepared for the project Towards an African Declaration on Good Financial 
Governance. Pretoria: African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), CABRI/ATAF. 
Bahiigwa, G., F. Ellis, O.H. Fjeldstad, and V. Iversen (2004). ‘Rural Taxation in Uganda: 
Implications for Growth, Income Distribution, Local Government Revenue and Poverty 
Reduction’. EPRC Research Series No. 35 (January 2004). Kampala: Economic Policy 
Research Centre. 
Barbone, L., A. Das-Gupta, L. de Wulf, and A. Hanson (1999). ‘Reforming Tax Systems: 
The World Bank Record in the 1990s’. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
2237. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Baunsgaard, T. and M. Keen (2005). ‘Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization’. 
Washington, DC: IMF. 
Benjamin, N. and A.A. Mbaye (2012). ‘The Informal Sector in Francophone Africa: Firm 
Size, Productivity, and Institutions’. Africa Development Forum Series. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Bird, R. (1984). Intergovernmental Finance in Colombia: Final Report of the Mission on 
Intergovernmental Finance. Cambridge: Law School of Harvard University. 
Bird, R.M. (1992). Tax Policy and Economic Development. Baltimore/London: The John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Bird, R. (2008). ‘Tax Challenges Facing Developing Countries’. Institute for International 
Business Working Paper 12 (March). Toronto: University of Toronto. 
Bird, R. (2012). ‘Taxation and Development: What Have We Learned from Fifty Years of 
Research?’. ICTD Working Paper 1. Brighton: International Center for Tax and 
Development. 
Bird, R. and P.-P. Gendron (2007). The VAT in Developing and Transitional Countries. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  23
Bird, R. and J. Jun (2005). ‘Earmarking in Theory and Korean Practice’. International Tax 
Program Working Papers 0513. Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of 
Toronto. 
Bird, R.M., J. Martinez-Vasquez, and B. Torgler (2006). ‘Societal Institutions and Tax Effort 
in Developing Countries’. In J. Alm, J. Martinez-Vazquez and M. Rider (eds), The 
Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy. New York: Springer Science+Business 
Media, Inc. 
Bird, R. and O. Oldman (1990). Taxation in Developing Countries. Baltimore and London: 
The John Hopkins University Press. 
Bird, R.M. and S. Wallace (2003). ‘Is it Really so Hard to Tax the Hard-to-Tax? The Context 
and Role of Presumptive Taxes’. International Tax Program Working Papers 0307. 
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. 
Bird, R.M. and E.M. Zolt (2003). ‘Introduction to Tax Policy Design and Development’. 
Paper for Course on Practical Issues of Tax Policy in Developing Countries. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
Braithwaite, V. (ed.) (2003). Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion: 
Ashgate Publishing. 
Braütigam, D., O.H. Fjeldstad, and M. Moore (2008). Taxation and State-building in 
Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brosio, G. (2000). ‘Decentralization in Africa’. Paper prepared for the Africa Department, 
International Monetary Fund. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Brun, J.-F., G. Chambas, and O.-H. Fjeldstad (2012). ‘Local Government Taxation in Africa: 
A Comparative Study of Anglophone and Francophone Countries’. ICTD Working Paper 
(forthcoming). Brighton: International Center for Tax and Development. 
Casanegra de Jantscher, M. (1990). ‘Administering the VAT’. In M. Gillis, C.S. Shoup and 
G.P. Sicat (eds), Value Added Taxation in Developing Countries. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Chand, S.K. and K.O. Moene (1999). ‘Controlling Fiscal Corruption’. World Development, 
27, 1129-40. 
Crandall, W. (2010). Revenue Administration: Performance Measurement in Tax 
Administration. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Daniel, P., M. Keen and C. McPherson (2010). The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: 
Principles, Problems and Practice. Abingdon: Routledge. 
De Mooij, R.A. and J.P. Ederveen (2003). ‘Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A 
Synthesis of Empirical Research’. International Tax and Public Finance, 10, 673-93. 
Devas, N., S. Delaym and M. Hubbard (2001). ‘Revenue Authorities: Are They the Right 
Vehicle for Improved Tax Administration?’. Public Administration and Development, 21, 
211-22. 
Drummond, P., W. Daal, N. Srivastava, and L.E. Oliveira (2012). ‘Mobilizing Revenue in 
sub-Saharan Africa: Empicial Norms and Key Determinants’. IMF Working Paper 
WP/12/108. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
European Commission (EC) (2010). ‘Tax and Development: Cooperating with Developing 
Countries on Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters’. Communication from the 
  24
Commission to the European Parliament, COM(2010)163 final (21 April). Brussels: The 
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, European Commission. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2001). ‘Taxation, Coercion and Donors: Local Government Tax 
Enforcement in Tanzania’. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 39, 289-306. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2003). ‘Fighting Fiscal Corruption: Lessons from the Tanzania Revenue 
Authority’. Public Administration and Development, 23. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2004). ‘What’s Trust Got to do With it? Non-payment of Service Charges in 
Local Authorities in South Africa’. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 42, 539-62. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2006). ‘Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional 
Reforms in Uganda’ (Chapter 17). In S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook 
on the Economics of Corruption. Cheltenham, UK/Northampton MA,USA: Edward 
Elgar. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2009). ‘Vers plus d’éthique dans les douanes en Afrique subsaharienne’ 
[‘The pursuit of integrity in customs: Experiences from sub-Saharan Africa’]. Afrique 
Contemporaine, 230, 33-54. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. and K. Heggstad (2011). ‘The Tax Systems in Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia: Capacity and Constraints’. CMI Report R 2011:3. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen 
Institute. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. and K. Heggstad (2012a). ‘Building Taxpayer Culture in Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zambia: Achievements, Challenges and Policy Recommendations’. CMI 
Report R 2012: 1. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. and K. Heggstad (2012b). ‘Local Government Revenue Mobilization in 
Anglophone African Countries’. CMI Working Paper WP 2012: 6. Bergen: Chr. 
Michelsen Institute. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H., L. Katera, J. Msami, and E. Ngalewa (2010). ‘Local Government Finances 
and Financial Management in Tanzania: Empirical Evidence of Trends 2000-2007’. 
REPOA Special Paper No. 10-2010 (October). Dar es Salaam: Research on Poverty 
Alleviation. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H., I. Kolstad, and S. Lange (2003). ‘Autonomy, Incentives and Patronage: A 
Study of Corruption in the Tanzania and Uganda Revenue Authorities’. CMI Report R 9: 
2003. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. and M. Moore (2008). ‘Tax Reform and State Building in a Globalized 
World’. In D. Braütigam, O.-H. Fjeldstad and M. Moore (eds), Taxation and State 
Building in Developing Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. and M. Moore (2009). ‘Revenue Authorities and Public Authority in sub-
Saharan Africa’. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 47, 1-18. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H., C. Schulz-Herzenberg and I.H. Sjursen (2012). ‘Peoples’ Views of Taxation 
in Africa: A Review of Determinants of Tax Compliance’. CMI Working Paper, WP 7. 
Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. and J. Semboja (2000). ‘Dilemmas of Fiscal Decentralization: A Study of 
Local Government Taxation in Tanzania’. Forum for Development Studies, 27, 7-41. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. and J. Semboja (2001). ‘Why People Pay Taxes: The Case of the 
Development Levy in Tanzania’. World Development, 29, 2059-74. 
  25
Fjeldstad, O.-H. and O. Therkildsen (2008). ‘Mass Taxation and State-society Relations in 
East Africa’. In D. Braütigam, O.-H. Fjeldstad and M. Moore (eds), Taxation and State 
Building in Developing Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. and B. Tungodden (2003). ‘Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue?’. World 
Development, 31, 1459-67. 
Gillis, M. (1990). ‘Micro- and Macroeconomics of Tax Reform: Indonesia’. In R. Bird and O. 
Oldman (eds), Taxation in Developing Countries. Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Goode, R. (1993). ‘Tax Advice to Developing Countries: An Historical Survey’. World 
Development, 21, 37-54. 
Hadler, S.C. (2000). ‘Best Practice in Tax Administration in sub-Saharan Africa: A 
Handbook for Officials’ (June). Boston: International Tax Program, Harvard Law 
School. 
House of Commons (2012). ‘Tax in Developing Countries: Increasing Resources for 
Development’. International Development Commiteee, Fourth Report of Session 2012-
13. London: The Stationery Office Limited. 
IBRD (1961). The Economic Development of Tanganyika. Baltimore: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, The Johns Hopkins Press. 
IEG (2008). ‘Public Sector Reform - What Works and Why?’. IEG Evaluation Report 2008 
(May). Washington, DC: Independent Evaluation Group. World Bank  
IMF (2011). ‘Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries’. Policy Paper prepared by the 
Fiscal Affairs Department (8 March). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank (2011). ‘Supporting the Development of More Effective 
Tax Systems’. Report to the G-20 Development Working Group. 
ITC (2010). ‘Mapping Survey: Taxation and Development’. Eschborn: International Tax 
Compact, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). 
ITC (2012). ‘Study on Mapping International Support to Taxation’. Eschborn: International 
Tax Compact, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). 
Jibao, S. and W. Prichard (2012). ‘Rebuilding Local Government Finances After Conflict: 
The Political Economy of Property Taxation in Post-conflict Sierra Leone’. ICTD 
Working Paper (forthcoming). Brighton: International Center for Tax and Development. 
Kaldor, N. (1963). ‘Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn to Tax?’. Foreign Affairs 
41(January), 410-19. 
Kar, D. and D. Cartwright-Smith (2010). ‘Illicit financial flows from Africa. Hidden 
Resources for Development’. Global Financial Integrity. 
Kariuki, E. (2012). ‘Performance Measurement in African Semi-autonomus Revenue 
Authorities: The Case of Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania’. PhD-thesis, University of 
Bradford. 
Keen, M. (2012). ‘Taxation and Development - Again’. IMF Working Paper WP/12/220. 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Keen, M. and M. Mansour (2010). ‘Revenue Mobilization in sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges 
from Globalization I - Trade Reform’. Development Policy Review, 28, 553-71. 
  26
Kidd, M. and W. Crandall (2006). ‘Revenue Authorities: An Evaluation of Their Impact on 
Revenue Administration Reform’. IMF Working Paper 6/240. Washington, DC: IMF. 
Kloeden, D. (2006). ‘Tax Regimes and Administration for Small Business’. Technical note, 
Fiscal Affairs Department. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Kloeden, D. (2011). ‘Revenue Administration Reforms in Anglophone Africa Since the Early 
1990s’. IMF Working Paper WP/11/162. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Lavallée, E., M. Razafindrakoto, and F. Roubaud (2008). ‘Corruption and Trust in Political 
Institutions in sub-Saharan Africa’. Afrobarometer Working Papers 102 (October). 
Levy, B. (2004). ‘Governance and Economic Development in Africa: Meeting the Challenge 
of Capacity Building’. In B. Levy and S. Kpundeh (eds), Building State Capacity in 
Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Luoga, F. (2002). ‘Taxpayers’ Rights in the Context of Democratic Governance: Tanzania’. 
IDS Bulletin, 33, 50-7. 
Moore, M. (2008). ‘Between Coercion and Contract: Competing Narratives Around Taxation 
and Governance’. In D. Braütigam, O.-H. Fjeldstad and M. Moore (eds), Taxation and 
State-building in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Nathan Associates Inc. (2004). ‘Tax Reform and the Business Environment in Mozambique: 
A Review of Private-sector Concerns’. (December). USAID  
Nathan Associates Inc. (2009). PARPA II Review - The Tax System in Mozambique. 
Volume I: USAID. 
OECD-DAC (2012). ‘Tax and Development: Aid Modalities for Strengthening Tax Systems’. 
Paris: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (August). 
OECD (2011). Revenue Statistics,1965-2010: 2011 edition [Online]. Paris: Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development. Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxpolicyanalysis/taxrevenuesstabiliseinoecdcountriesin2010.ht
m [Accessed 08.10. 2012]. 
Owens, J. and S. Hamilton (2004). ‘Experience and Innovations in Other Countries’. In H.J. 
Aaron and J. Slemrod (eds), The Crisis in Tax Administration. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Prichard, W. (2010). ‘Taxation and State-building: Towards a Governance Focused Tax 
Reform Agenda’. IDS Working Paper 341. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
Prichard, W., J.-F. Brun and O. Morrissey (2012a). ‘Donors, Aid and Taxation in Developing 
Countries: An Overview’. ICTD Working Paper (forthcoming). Brighton: International 
Centre for Tax and Development. 
Prichard, W., A. Joshi, and C. Heady (2012b). ‘Taxation of the Informal Economy’. ICTD 
Working Paper (forthcoming). Brighton: International Centre for Tax and Development. 
Rajkumar, A.S. (2004). ‘Tying the Hands of Government in Brazil Through Revenue 
Earmarking: How Can This be Done Optimally?’. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Serra, P. (2003). ‘Measuring the Performance of Chile’s Tax Administration’. National Tax 
Journal, 56, 373-83. 
Slemrod, J. (1992). ‘Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement’. In 
J. Slemrod (ed.), Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
  27
Stewart, M. (2002). Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: Mapping Tax Reform in Developing 
and Transition Countries. University of Melbourne. 
Tait, A. (1990). ‘IMF Advice on Fiscal Policy’. In G. Krause-Junk (ed.), Public Finance and 
Steady Economic Growth. The Hague: International Institute of Public Finance. 
Taliercio, R.J. (2004a). ‘Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment: The Impact of 
Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America’. World Development, 
32, 213-32. 
Taliercio, R.J. (2004b). ‘Designing Performance: The Semi-autonomous Revenue Authority 
Model in Africa and Latin-America’. Policy Research Working Paper 3423. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
Taliercio, R.R. (2003). ‘Designing Performance: The Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority 
Model in Africa and Latin America’. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Tanzi, V. (2000). ‘Taxation and Economic Structure’. In G. Perry, J. Whalley and G. 
McMahon (eds), Fiscal Reform and Structural Change in Developing Countries, Vol. 2. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Tanzi, V. and H.H. Zee (2000). Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries. 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Tendler, J. (2002). ‘Small firms, the Informal Sector and the Devil’s Deal’. IDS Bulletin, 33. 
Terpker, S. (1999). ‘Revenue Authorities: A Comparison of the Experiences of Ghana and 
East African Countries’. Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, 53, 171–9. 
Terpker, S. (2003). ‘Managing Small and Medium-size Taxpayers in Developing Countries’. 
Tax Notes International, 211-34. 
Therkildsen, O. (2004). ‘Autonomous Tax Administration in sub-Saharan Africa: The Case 
of the Uganda Revenue Authority'. Forum for Development Studies, 31, 59-88. 
Thirsk, W.R. (1993). ‘Recent Experience with Tax Reform in Developing Countries’. In 
R.D.M. Faini (ed.), Fiscal Issues in Adjustment in Developing Countries. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Thirsk, W.R. (1997). ‘Tax Reform in Developing Countries’. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
TI (2008). Bribe Payers Index 2008 [Online]. Berlin: TI International Secretariat, 
Transparency International. Available: 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2008/bpi_2008_en 
[Accessed]. 
TJN-AA (2012). ‘Tax Competition in East Africa: A Race to the Bottom?’. 
Johannesburg/Nairobi: Tax Justice Network-Africa and ActionAid International. 
van Parys, S. and S. James (2009). ‘Why Tax Incentives may be an Ineffective Tool to 
Encouraging Investment? - The Role of Investment Climate’ (December 1). 
von Soest, C. (2006). ‘The African State and the Capability to Raise Revenue: A 
Comparative Study of the Tax Administration in Zambia and Botswana’. Dissertation zur 
Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doctor Philosophiae (Dr. phil.), Universität 
Leipzig. 
von Soest, C. (2007). ‘Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue: Process and Output 
Dimensions and Their Application to the Zambia Revenue Authority’. Public 
Administration and Development, 27, 353-65. 
  28
von Soest, C. (2008). ‘Donor Support for Tax Administration Reform in Africa: Experiences 
from Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia’. German Development Institute Discussion 
Paper 2. Bonn: German Development Institute. 
World Bank (2000). ‘Reforming Tax Systems: Lessons from the 1990s’. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Zee, H., J. Stotsky, and E. Ley (2002). ‘Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for 
Policy Makers in Developing Countries’. World Development, 30, 1497-1516. 
Zolt, E.M. and R. Bird (2005). ‘Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the 
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries’. UCLA Law Review, 52 (August), 1627-
95. 
Zuleta, J.C., A. Leyton, and F. Ivanovic (2006). ‘Corruption in the Revenue Service: The 
Case of VAT Refunds in Bolivia’. World Bank. 
 
